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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the semantic relation between continental
drift and plate tectonics. The numerous attempts to account for this case in either Kuhnian or
Lakatosian terms have been convincingly dismissed by Rachel Laudan (PSA: Proceedings of
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Symposia and Invited
Papers, 1978), who nevertheless acknowledged that there was not yet a plausible alternative
to explain the so called ‘‘geological revolution’’. Several decades later, the epistemological
side of this revolution has received much attention (Ruse in The darwinian paradigm, essays
on its history, philosophy and religious implications. London, Routledge, 1981/1989; Tha-
gard in Conceptual revolutions. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992; Marvin in
Metascience 10:208–217, 2001; Oreskes in Plate tectonics: an insiders’ history of the modern
theory of the earth. Westview Press, Boulder, 2003), while the semantic relation between
drift theory and plate tectonics has remained mainly unexplored. In studying this case under a
new light, the notion of embedding, as distinguished from other sorts of intertheoretical
relations (Moulines in Cognitio Humana—Dynamik des Wissens und der Werte. XVII,
Institut fu¨r Philosophie der Universita¨t Leipzig, Leipzig, 1996, Time, chance, and reduction:
philosophical aspects of statistical mechanics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2010, Metatheoria 1(2):11–27, 2011), will have a particular significance. After formally
analyzing the relationship between continental drift and plate tectonics, it will become
evident that the models of drift theory are part of the models of plate tectonics, thereby
fulfilling the conditions for embedding. All theoretical concepts from drift theory are pre-
supposed in some theoretical concepts from plate tectonics, and all empirical concepts of the
former are shared by the latter. Furthermore, all the successful paradigmatic applications of
continental drift are also successful applications of plate tectonics. As a consequence, under
the label ‘‘geological revolution’’, we actually find a salient historical case of cumulative
progress across theory change.
& Marı´a Caaman˜o-Alegre
mariac@fyl.uva.es
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Valladolid, Valladolid, Spain
123
Found Sci
DOI 10.1007/s10699-016-9505-8
Keywords Embedding  Geological revolution  Plate tectonics  Continental drift  Partial
substructures
1 Introduction
The current idea of scientific development is still strongly inspired by T. S. Kuhn’s dis-
tinction between normal science and revolutionary science (Kuhn 1962). Without disputing
the relevance of such dichotomic distinction to understand the sharp differences between
continuous and discontinuous periods of scientific advancement, it may be helpful to
emphasize the significance of a peculiar historical episode that has remained misidentified
as a result of exploring the history of science through a Kuhnian lens. As explained in the
next section, the numerous attempts to account for the relation between continental drift
and plate tectonics in Kuhnian terms have been convincingly dismissed by several authors,
who nevertheless have not yet supplied a plausible alternative to explain the so called
‘‘geological revolution’’. The purpose of this work is to show the relevance of the notion of
embedding for elucidating the above historical case. This mathematical, model-theoretic
notion was originally used in the philosophy of empirical science by Suppes and then
further applied mainly by semanticist philosophers like Van Fraassen (1980, 42, 43),
according to whom it requires the inclusion of each model of a theory into a model of
another theory—every model of T1 would thus be identified with a substructure of a model
of T2. Even if the above characterization captures the core of the notion of embedding, the
one that I will apply has been provided by Moulines (2011), who introduces the key notion
of echeloned partial substructure and thereby makes it possible to reveal the mode of
preservation of partial substructures. By studying this historical case under a new light, the
very notion of embedding will become clearer and its explanatory power more obvious.
As pointed out by Moulines, cases of embedding should be distinguished from three
other kinds of diachronic developments in science, such as evolution, replacement and
crystallization (1996, 2010, 41–42; 2011, 13–17; 2014, 1507–1511). Normal science—as
well as the Lakatosian notion of research program- roughly corresponds to what Moulines
calls ‘‘evolution’’, since in both cases a theoretical network (or theory-net, for short)
evolves in time by adding or removing from the network some specialized theories (theory-
elements, in what follows), without losing its identity, which is determined by an
unchanged initial or basic theory-element.1 The development of Newtonian mechanics
from the end of the seventeenth century until the beginning of the last century is often
mentioned as a case in point. Revolutionary science, on the other hand, can be equated with
1 In structuralist literature (Balzer et al. 1987, 167–177), the notion of a theory-net is defined by establishing
two conditions: 1) that there should exist a finite non-empty set of theory-elements TE and a specialization
relation r; 2) that the specialization relation be restricted to the set TE. Given that the definition of a theory-
net presupposes that of specialisation, the principle defining features of this should be mentioned, even if in
passing. They are as follows: a) equality between the classes of potential models and partially potential
models of the respective related theory-elements; and, b) the inclusion of the current class of models, the
class of constraints, the class of links and that of intended applications of the (resulting) specialized theory,
respectively, in the class of actual models, the class of constraints, the class of links, and that of the intended
applications of the theory that is specialized. Expressed in other terms, two theory-elements that are related
by means of a specialization relation will share their conceptual apparatus, while they will diverge with
regard to the scope of their laws and, consequently, with regard to the extension of their classes of intended
applications, since the theory-element that specializes restricts the laws and the empirical scope of the
specialized theory-element.
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Moulines’ notion of replacement, which refers to cases where a theory is completely
replaced by another one with similar intended applications, although very different from a
conceptual point of view. The superseding of Ptolemaic astronomy by Copernican
astronomy or that of the phlogiston theory of combustion by the oxygen theory are usually
presented as clear examples of replacement. Unlike other sorts of diachronic developments
that clearly exhibit either a continuous character or a discontinuous one, crystallization
occurs when continuous and discontinuous aspects are combined in the emergence of a
complex, fully developed theory (Moulines 2010, 142). According to the reconstruction by
Moulines (2011), Clausius’s Phenomenological Thermodynamics would be a case of
crystallization. Among the plausible not yet reconstructed cases (2011, 15), he mentions
the emergence of Ptolemaic astronomy (s. III a.C.-s. II d.C.), Cartesian mechanics
(1630–1670), and Mendelian genetics (1865–1905).
Furthermore, Moulines noted that there is possibly a second Kuhnian sense of revo-
lutionary science- hardly discussed by Kuhn himself and most frequently overlooked by his
critics-,2 which points to cases of cumulative progress where the models of a previous
theory are (approximately) embedded into the models of a more complex theory, hence the
label ‘‘embedding’’. The relation between Keplerian planetary theory and Newtonian
mechanics, as well as that between Cartesian collision mechanics and the latter, provide
two historical illustrations of embedding, where a new theory, with a wider scope of
application, approximately includes the content of an old theory (Balzer et al. 1987,
chapters VI–VII). This kind of advancement, although very different from the one char-
acteristic of normal science, is still markedly continuous in the sense that it does not entail
discarding the earlier theory, but rather subsuming it under the latter one. Interestingly, the
case of embedding under study here is not mentioned among the plausible not yet
reconstructed cases suggested by Moulines (2011, 16), which would include the embed-
ding of the wave optics into Maxwell’s electrodynamic theory, and of the latter into the
special theory of relativity, or the embedding of the Darwinian theory of evolution into the
synthetic theory of evolution. As shown in Sect. 4, however, the emergence of plate
tectonics nicely fits the conditions defining embedding.
It is interesting to take a moment and notice how Kuhn himself discusses, and then
disregards as irrelevant, the possibility of knowledge accumulation from old paradigms to
new ones. After stressing that the assimilation of either a new sort of phenomenon or a new
scientific theory entails the rejection of an older paradigm, he denies that this can be
explained by virtue of the logical structure of scientific knowledge. He then proceeds to
briefly consider possible cases in which the acceptance of a new theory would not prompt
the rejection of the preceding one:
‘‘In principle, a new phenomenon might emerge without reflecting destructively
upon any part of past scientific practice. (…) a new theory does not have to conflict
with any of its predecessors.
(…) Nevertheless, despite the immense plausibility of that ideal image, there is
increasing reason to wonder whether it can possibly be an image of science. After the
pre-paradigm period the assimilation of all new theories and of almost all new sorts
of phenomena has in fact demanded the destruction of a prior paradigm and a
consequent conflict between competing schools of scientific thought. Cumulative
acquisition of unanticipated novelties proves to be an almost non-existent exception
to the rule of scientific development. The man who takes historic fact seriously must
2 One of the few places (if not the only one) where Kuhn elaborates on this matter is 1962/1970, 95–97.
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suspect that science does not tend toward the ideal that our image of its cumula-
tiveness has suggested. Perhaps it is another sort of enterprise’’ (Kuhn 1962/1970,
95–96).
Thus, according to Kuhn, there is no intrinsic logical constraint on scientific knowledge
requiring that new paradigms conflict with old ones. Yet, as a matter of historical fact, the
usual dynamics of scientific practice renders conflict between successive paradigms as the
rule and lack of conflict as ‘‘an almost non-existent exception’’. Among the exceptional
cases, he mentions quantum mechanics, which mainly accounts for new phenomena just
replacing ignorance, and the theory of energy conservation, which provides a higher level
theory connecting a group of lower level theories. Only the former example would provide
a case of embedding in the sense previously discussed.
The present analysis of the geological revolution in terms of embedding casts some
doubts on the accuracy of the above Kuhnian view, undermining the idea that cases of
embedding constitute extremely rare episodes of scientific development. But before turning
to the case of geology, a more detailed characterization of embedding is provided. A
historical sketch of the emergence of plate tectonics and an overview of the philosophical
controversies around it are provided in the third section. The fourth section is devoted to
the analysis of the semantic relation between continental drift and plate tectonics, one that,
as it is shown there, meets the conditions for embedding. The philosophical consequences
that can be drawn from this analysis are fully elaborated in Sects. 4 and 5.
2 The Meta-theoretical Notion of ‘‘Embedding’’
Before presenting Moulines’ definition of embedding, let us clarify some basic structuralist
notions. From the structuralist standpoint, a scientific theory is not just constituted by a
class of models (i.e., sequences of set-theoretical entities) satisfying a set-theoretical
predicate, but by different classes of models, hierarchically organized according to the
level of complexity, and satisfying a correspondingly complex set-theoretical predicate
(Moulines 2002, 4–5). Two main classes of models are distinguished: on the one hand, the
class of potential models (‘Mp’, from now on), which just satisfy the theory’s frame
conditions, and, on the other hand, the actual models (‘M’ in what follows), which satisfy
both the frame conditions and the substantial/theoretical laws (Balzer et al. 1987, 2–6).
Frame conditions just supply the conceptual machinery or descriptive resources of a the-
ory, that is, they set the formal properties of the scientific concepts employed in a theory
(i.e. of each domain or relation included in the theory). The empirical substructures of Mp
form the class of a theory’s partial potential models (‘Mpp’ from now on). Partial potential
models play a decisive role in the empirical interpretation and application of the potential
models in which they are included (Balzer et al. 1987, 277). Since usually a theory is
primarily directed towards the empirical substructures of Mpp, within the structuralist
approach such specially relevant subset has been differentiated from the rest of empirical
substructures and characterized as T’s ‘‘intended applications’’ (‘I’, in what follows). As
this very label suggests, I has a predominantly pragmatic nature, for it includes those
empirical substructures that are targeted by the scientific community endorsing the theory.
The distinction between Mp (theoretical structures) and Mpp (empirical substructures) is
drawn on the basis of another distinction, that between T-theoretical concepts and T-non-
theoretical concepts. T-theoretical concepts can only be determined by applying T’s actual
models (corresponding to the substantial laws), T-non-theoretical models, on the other
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hand, are determined by models coming from outside of T, typically by the actual models
of other underlying (presupposed) theories included (Balzer et al. 1987, 62–67, 73–77,
Moulines 2002, 7–8).
In a paper from 2011, Moulines introduces the key notion of echeloned partial sub-
structure in order to develop a more fine grained analysis of the piecemeal fashion in which
the models of a new theory are constructed. As will become clear in the forthcoming
sections, such notion proves very helpful in accounting for the embedding of drift theory
into plate tectonics, a case in which, according to the present study, preservation of partial
substructures of theoretical models plays a crucial role.
The development of new formal resources to provide a more fine-grained differentiation
between separate constituents of models goes hand in hand with the advances in explaining
the nature of inter-theoretical relations. Moulines’ technical notion of echeloned partial
substructure is a case in point (2011, 18; 2014, 1511), since it has already been proven
applicable not only to the crystallization of Clausius’s Phenomenological Thermodynamics
(2011, 19–21), but also to cases of radical incommensurability between theories connected
by an ontological non-reductive relation (Falguera and Donato Rodrı´guez 2015, 15).
Following Moulines’ formal account of embedding, which he defines by using the notion
of echeloned partial substructure, we can start by clarifying the standard notion of partial
substructure.
Let S = hA1,…, Ani be a structure with m domains D1,…, Dm and n-m relations (with
n[m) Rm?1,…, Rn. Let S* be a structure. Let A be a domain or a relation.
Definition 1.1 A 2^ S iff Ai(1 B i B n ^ A = Ai).
‘‘A 2^ S’’ is read as: ‘‘A is a component of S’’.3
Definition 1.2 S* 2^ S iff VA 2^ S*: A 2^ S.
‘‘S* 2^ S’’ is read as ‘‘S* is a partial substructure of S’’. Trivially, any component of S can
be regarded as a substructure of S.4
Simply put, the idea of an echeloned partial substructure is that of a relation of set
theoretical construction between substructures, so that one of them results from applying
certain set-theoretic operations over the components of the other. The latter is hence
regarded as an echeloned partial substructure of the former, satisfying the following
definitions:
Definition 1.3 H is the set-theoretic operation consisting in successively applying ‘‘Pot’’
(power set) and ‘‘9’’ (cartesian product) to some previously given set(s) a finite number of
times to, always beginning with Pot.
Definition 1.4 A is an echelon-set over B1,…, Bm iff A [ H(B1,…, Bm).
Definition 1.5 S is an echeloned partial substructure of S* (S g S*) iff VSi(Si 2^ S) ASk*(Sk* 2^
S*): Si [ H(Sk
*).
3 The reader should note that the symbol ‘2^’ expresses a relation between a component of a structure and
the structure itself, and so it is not to be confused with the element-of symbol ‘[’ used later, which expresses
a relation between an element and a set.
4 Here we are assuming the notion of substructure that is standard in model theory. Under this character-
ization, a structure S is a substructure of other S’ when the domains of S are proper or improper subsets of
the domains of S’, and, therefore, the relations of S are restrictions over the relations of S’.
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We can now turn to the formal definition of embedding, which first requires defining the
auxiliary notion of ‘‘success’’ (Moulines 2011, 24; 2014, 1517):
Definition 2.1 Let m be an actual model of a theory-element Ti from the net N. Then, m is
a ‘‘successful model’’ in N iff there exists an intended application y of Ti such that
y = r(m).5 Similarly, y is a successful application iff there exists an actual model m of Ti
such that y = r(m).
Definition 2.2 The Theory-net N is embeddable into net N* iff.
1. Any successful model in N is an (approximative) echeloned partial substructure of
some successful model in N*;
2. Any successful intended application in N is an (approximative) echeloned partial
substructure of some successful intended application in N*.
According to this definition, the embedding of a theory-net into another involves the
fulfilment of two conditions: first, for every successful model in N there is a set-theoretic
construct in N* that results from performing operation H over the components of such
model and constitutes a successful model in N*; second, for every successful application in
N there is a set-theoretic construct in N* that results from performing operation H over the
components of such application and constitutes a successful application in N*. Given that
the reconstruction presented here is restricted to the basic theory elements of two suc-
cessive geological theories, I will skip the details regarding theory-nets. The former
conditions for embedding will thus be examined only with regard to successful models and
applications of the corresponding theory-elements.
3 A Historical Sketch of the Emergence of Plate Tectonics
and the Philosophical Controversies Around it
The so called ‘‘geological revolution’’ took place towards the middle of the twentieth
century, after a long journey of accumulation of empirical data (Thagard 1992, 163,
171–190, Oreskes 2003, 13–27). Geological anomalies like that of coastlines’ fit remained
unexplained by the theory of Earth’s contraction and could only be later explained by
Wegener’s theory of continental drift, which nonetheless, as often pointed out by histo-
rians, did not supersede the contraction theory until it was subsequently modified and
completed by plate tectonics.
According to the standard literature on the subject (Laudan 1978; Cohen 1985/2001;
Thagard 1992; Marvin 2001; Oreskes 2003), when Alfred Wegener presented his con-
jecture regarding continental drift in 1915, the predominant view was that the solid Earth
had a stable nature and that actual geological accidents like mountains had been caused by
contraction due to the decrease in temperature. Yet, the jigsaw-puzzle fit of the continental
edges was a well known fact as early as the 16th century, and such fact, together with
others established in the 19th century from paleontological and paleoenvironmental
research, were the ones that led Wegener to develop the theory of continental drift. More
precisely, he relied on observations regarding: (1) the fit of the continents’ edges, (2) the
correlation of fossil plants and animals as well as of rock strata across oceans, and (3) the
presence of cold climate indicators (such as ancient glacial deposits) near the equator, and
5 Function ‘r’ assigns to every actual model ‘m’ the corresponding partial potential model ‘y’ that results
from cutting the T-theoretical concepts from ‘m’.
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the presence of warm climate indicators (such as limestones, laterites and coals) near the
poles. Wegener explained all these facts by supposing that, originally, all continents were
together forming a single supercontinent (Pangaea) and that, through time, they moved
away from each other thereby shifting their position. According to his theory, mountain
formation is caused by the resistance of cool oceanic crust to continental movement.
It has been frequently emphasized by historians and philosophers dealing with the
geological revolution that Wegener’s theory faced a strong opposition by most geologists
of that period, and it was never fully accepted by the scientific community (Frankel 1979,
49–52; Ruse 1981–1989, 73–74, 85–87; Cohen 1985/2001, 446, 464–465; Marvin 2001,
213–215; Oreskes 2003, 10–12). The replacement of the contraction theory did not happen
until the 60 s, when plate tectonics developed and received strong support from many
mutually independent sources, such as oceanographic, paleomagnetic, and seismic evi-
dence. These kinds of evidence would make it possible to develop an empirically sound
account of continental movement, one that not only covered the main explanatory gap in
the previous account—namely, the causal mechanism of such motion- but provided a wide
variety of independent and strong empirical support for the postulated mechanism. The key
importance of the new evidence is stressed by M. Ruse’s remark that:
‘‘(…) although to the lay-person fitting together the continents is the key point in the
new geology—to many of the new geologists themselves it is somewhat peripheral.
What really counts is the newness of the ocean beds, and the magnetic reversals’’
(1981–1989, 83).
Let us recall that it was not until quite recently (i.e. from the nineties) that scientists
could find some direct evidence concerning the motion of continents, and, for most of the
twentieth century, the predictive capacity of geology remained quite limited, so refutation
of geological theories by means of their false predictions was not a serious option. Hence,
the current theory of plate tectonics was developed between 1962 and 1968 on the basis of
several independent observations from sea floor and earthquakes, originally collected by
geophysicists who were not involved in the development of this theory. By the end of the
fifties, there was no doubt that the Earth’s magnetic field had changed repeatedly
throughout time, as both the remanent magnetism detected in sedimentary continental
rocks and the magnetic anomalies observed round the mid-ocean ridges clearly suggested
those magnetic reversals (Oreskes 2003, 19–20). The drift of continents thereby became
the most plausible explanation for a variety of independently established facts. The new
results from oceanography that were now available to geologists also provided evidence
for Harry H. Hess’ hypothesis that the sea floor was spreading. The distinctive striped
pattern of magnetized basaltic rocks on both sides of the mid-ocean ridges, together with
the transfer of heat detected in those areas, led to the conclusion that lava was continuously
flowing from canyons located along the crest of the ridges (Oreskes 2003, 21–23). Finally,
the accurate determination of earthquakes’ locations and directions displayed a pattern
resembling moving blocks. All this combined evidence supported the conjecture that both
continents and sea floors stand on moving plates whose dynamics manifests itself in the
phenomena of sea floor spreading and destruction. Such conjecture was independently
developed by several geologists, like J. Tuzo Wilson, Daniel P. McKenzie together with
Robert L. Parker, and Jason Morgan, providing a synthetic picture of crustal motions as
rigid body rotations on a sphere (Oreskes 2003, 25–27). Mountains, on the other hand,
were now understood as geological formations resulting in some cases from the pressure
and friction between colliding plates and, in some other cases, from collision between
continents and island arcs, oceanic plateaus and microcontinents (Frisch et al. 2011,
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149–158). In all these cases, a very gradual process of subduction of continental or oceanic
crust originated the later collisions. The overall picture resulting from this decades-long
gathering of evidence is presented by Oreskes as follows:
‘‘A global picture now emerged. Oceans split apart at their centers, where new ocean
floor is created by submarine volcanic eruptions. The crust then moves laterally
across the ocean basins. Ultimately, it collides with continents along their margins
(edges), where the ocean crust sinks underneath, back into Earth’s mantle. As it does,
it compresses the continental margins, generating folded mountain belts and magmas
that rise to the surface as volcanoes, and deep earthquakes as the cold, dense ocean
slab sinks farther and farther back into the earth’’ (2003, 26–27).
Although the predominant tendency among historians and philosophers was to provide a
Kuhnian explanation of the geological developments that occurred over the twentieth
century, this sort of account has been criticized on different grounds. When Rachel Lau-
dan’s critical paper ‘‘The Recent Revolution in Geology and Kuhn’s Theory of Scientific
Change’’ was published in 1978, the standard view that changes taking place in geology
from the sixties amounted to a Kuhnian revolution had been hardly questioned. On this
matter, she mentions some historians like J. Tuzo Wilson, Ursula Marvin, Allan Cox or
Arthur Hallam, who, although more cautious than the others, also argued that the non-
linear development of geology fitted the pattern of a revolution in the Kuhnian sense. It
should be noticed, however, that this non-linear nature of geological research, was only
broadly characterized and described in different terms by different authors, partly
depending on what features, among the ones initially pointed out by Kuhn as typical of a
change of paradigm, were taken into account. Even if some authors endorsed the view
there is a conceptual break between pre- and post-plate tectonic theories, in most cases, the
corresponding analyses were conceptually informal and usually included a reference to a
wide variety of heterogeneous features such as changes of methods, shift of standards of
evidence, or the sudden conversion of scientists. According to Laudan, the main criticism
to the standard interpretation came from David Kitts, who argued that the existence of
shared basic physical principles underlying competing geological theories is not compat-
ible with a Kuhnian revolution, which would require the replacement of a comprehensive
paradigm. As she notes, however, Kitts’ reading of Kuhn seems unconvincing for several
reasons, not only because some classical Kuhnian examples, like the Darwinian revolution
or the Lyellian revolution, do not imply any replacement of fundamental physical or
chemical principles, but also because Kuhn himself acknowledged that the scope of rev-
olutions could be wider or narrower (1969/1970, 198–202).6 In arguing for the quality of
the evidence supporting geological theories as the key aspect involved in their career,
Laudan dismisses the idea that their possible conflict with physical laws or their lack of an
explanatory physical mechanism were essential in that regard (1978, 229–232).7 She
concludes that the emergence of plate tectonics was neither a Kuhnian revolution- since
there was no incommensurability between this theory and drift theory, nor a Lakatosian
evolution, as suggested by Frankel (1979)—since no stability of a hard core seems
6 Furthermore, in Kuhn’s later proposal (1983, 670–1), he explicitly characterizes the notion of incom-
mensurability as a local or partial relation between theories.
7 By stressing the importance of evidence quality as the driving force in the career of geological theories,
she therefore also opposes the popular view put forward by Stephen Jay Gould (1977), which implied that
the initial rejection of drift theory was due to a lack of an adequate mechanism to move continents through a
static ocean floor.
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compatible with the new ontological commitments entailed by plate tectonics, like the very
notion of tectonic plate or that of sea floor spreading (Laudan 1978, 235–236). More
broadly, she concedes that understanding the emergence of plate tectonics remains an open
question.
Laudan rightly questions the standard approach to twentieth century geology based on
the Kuhnian concept of scientific revolution, as well as the one inspired by Lakatos’ ideas.
However, since she is most interested in explaining the epistemological side of the his-
torical career of drift theory, she focuses on issues related to evidence and the corre-
sponding decisions of acceptance or rejection taken by the scientific community, rather
than on the conceptual implications of the relation between drift theory and plate tectonics,
which is the focus of the current analysis. Several issues, thus, still pose some problems for
the accounts of the development of geology available to present. Many of such problems
arise from a lack of detail in analyzing the conceptual constituents of theories. In fact, none
of the wide and heterogeneous set of features commonly regarded as characteristic of a
change of paradigm in the Kuhnian sense—which would include replacement of general
disciplinary principles, shift of methodological and evidential standards or sudden con-
version- is the essential feature consistently emphasized by Kuhn in his writings. The
essential feature to which he draws attention is the conceptual incompatibility or incom-
mensurability between rival theories. It should be remembered that the notion of incom-
mensurability was introduced simultaneously and independently by Kuhn (1962/1970), and
Paul K. Feyerabend (1962/1981), with the aim of characterizing relations between rival
scientific theories. Both authors coincide in presenting it as a radical form of conceptual
disparity between theories that are applied to the same field of research. The radicality of
conceptual disparity was due not only to the fact that theories would be made up of
different concepts, but also to the fact that the conditions for the formation of these
concepts would be incompatible. In accordance with both authors, this becomes apparent
in the incompatibility between the rules of use for the terms that transmit these concepts.
Incommensurability between rival scientific theories would be patent not only in the
impossibility of mutually translating the languages that express these theories, but also in
the impossibility of expanding one of these languages in order for it to incorporate the
other.
The question as to whether the aforesaid problem may have arisen between geological
theories has remained unclear in the available discussions on the subject. One exception is
worth mentioning: Thagard’s approach to the semantic side of the revolution in geology,
where he certainly applies some central Kuhnian notions, like the idea that changes in
taxonomic categories are characteristic of scientific revolutions (1992, 7–8, 160–170). His
argument that the emergence of plate tectonics involved a dramatic reorganization of the
kind-hierarchy and part-hierarchy developed from drift theory is nevertheless questionable.
According to his account, the new concept of sea floor spreading was crucial in the above
reorganization, which concerned continents and sea floors, more specifically involving
their reconceptualization not only as different kinds of surface but also as parts of plates,
instead of parts of the earth’s crust (1992, 182). Despite Thagard’s careful attempt to
provide a Kuhnian picture of the development of plate tectonics, there is one important
element missing, and that is the semantic incommensurability between both theories.
Regardless of whether one endorses the Kuhnian view on scientific revolutions—and
therefore of how one understands the label ‘‘scientific revolution’’, what is clear is that
there is no conceptual incompatibility between the central notions of both theories. In fact,
the taxonomic changes identified by Thagard result in an addition of properties ascribed to
continents and sea floors, rather than in a conflicting conceptualization of these geological
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units. Contrary to what Thagard seems to suggest, considering continents and sea floors as
parts of plates does not exclude but rather presupposes considering them as parts of the
earth’s crust. In short, kind-hierarchy and part-hierarchy developed from drift theory is
presupposed in the corresponding hierarchies from plate tectonics. The acknowledged
differences between continents and sea floor certainly increase with the emergence of the
latter, but the newly determined properties mainly contributed to develop a more detailed
account of the Earth’s crust, thereby supplementing the account of the crust provided by
drift theory. Continents and sea floors were certainly assumed to be similar parts of the
crust in Wegener’s theory and very dissimilar parts of the crust in Hess’ theory, however,
this assumption was not essential to drift theory, since the assumed similarity played no
explanatory role in this theory.
Arguments similar to the previous ones have been put forward by Laudan (1978, 228,
235) in rejecting Cox’s view that there is incommensurability between drift theory and
plate tectonics. Although the analysis offered in the next section is just meant to clarify the
conceptual relationship between both theories, an intuitive application of the notion of
incommensurability clearly supports Laudan’s view. While the difference between the
vertical movement of continents postulated from the contraction theory and the lateral
movement postulated from drift theory could represent a case of incommensurability, no
conceptual incompatibility of this kind is detectable between drift theory and plate tec-
tonics, since both theories share the assumption about lateral continental movement.
On the contrary, the idea that there is a constitutive link between continental drift and
plate tectonics, despite the historical neglect of the former over decades, can be found in
Oreskes’ remarks that:
‘‘Continental drift was not accepted when first proposed, but in the 1960s it became a
cornerstone of the new global theory of plate tectonics. The motion of land masses is
now explained as a consequence of moving ‘‘plates’’—large fragments of the earth’s
surface layer in which the continents are embedded’’ (2003, 3).
It is important to notice, however, that the motion of continents was not part of the
intended explanandum of plate tectonics but rather part of its explanans, since both theories
rely on such motion to explain some other facts that are included in their shared intended
explananda, like mountain formation. Furthermore, the movement of continents was not
taken for granted as an empirical fact by the time plate tectonics emerged, it was rather part
of a conjecture intended to explain some new well-established facts, like sea floor
spreading and destruction. The intuitive idea that a theory provides the explanandum for
another theory is captured by the structuralist notion of theoretization (Balzer et al. 1987,
251), the latter referring to that intertheoretical relation where the empirical concepts of T*
(i.e. T*-non-theoretical concepts) are concepts belonging to T (T-theoretical or T-non-
theoretical). Interestingly, as I will show later, plate tectonics and drift theory do share
some empirical concepts, hence meeting the minimal condition for what Balzer et al. call
‘‘weak theoretization’’, namely, that some of T*-non-theoretical concepts come from T.
Yet, this only means that both theories overlap in their respective explananda, not that one
constitutes that explanandum for the other, which would require what they call ‘‘strong
theoretization’’—where all of T*-non-theoretical concepts come from T. Further discussion
of this issue is provided in Sect. 4.3.
In short, we have ruled out three different alternative ways to understand the rela-
tionship between both theories, namely, a Kuhnian revolution connecting incommensu-
rable theories, a Lakatosian evolution from a stable hard core, and a theoretization of
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continental drift from plate tectonics. In the next section, the relation between both theories
is interpreted as a case embedding.
4 The Embedding of Continental Drift into Plate Tectonics
The remaining of the paper is focused on the relation between continental drift theory and
plate tectonics. In the next section I will formally analyze the main three classes of models
(i.e. potential, actual, and partial) constitutive of continental drift and plate tectonics. By
clarifying the structure of each theory, it will become evident that the models of drift
theory are part of the models of plate tectonics, thereby fulfilling the conditions of Defi-
nition 2.2. This constitutive relation holds for each kind of model, that is, between the
respective potential, actual and partial models of both theories. All theoretical concepts
from drift theory are presupposed in some theoretical concepts from plate tectonics. The
very concept of continental drift, for instance, is implied by the concept of tectonic drift.
On the other hand, their respective applicative domains and paradigmatic applications also
present a significant overlap, since both theories share most empirical concepts, i.e., those
inherited from either some pre-theoretical notions, or some well-established, commonly
accepted theories.
For the sake of simplicity, I will not reconstruct here two of the characteristic com-
ponents of the above theories, to wit, their respective inter-theoretical links—i.e. cross-
connections between the models of different theories- and constraints—i.e. cross-con-
nections between the models of one and the same theory (Moulines 2002, 7). Instead of
reconstructing the links that are necessary to define some non-theoretical concepts of each
theory, I shall just mention some of the different theories on which the determination of
these concepts depends. The same goes for constraints on the properties that the targeted
systems should preserve at different applications of drift theory and plate tectonics (Balzer
et al. 1987, 40–47). I shall here confine myself to mentioning a main non-theoretical
constraint shared by both theories, one usually referred to as ‘‘principle of isostasy’’
(Thagard 1992, 166). This geophysical principle asserts that, if not disturbed, the crust is in
gravitational equilibrium, there being equal forces holding it up and pulling it down. The
buoyancy force of different pieces of crust floating on denser strata below would coun-
teract gravity. Accordingly, in order for a piece of crust to be part of different models from
either theory, it should be in isostatic equilibrium, so that any vertical force acting in one
direction would be compensated by other vertical force acting in the opposite direction.
4.1 Continental Drift Theory (‘DRIFT’ in what follows)
4.1.1 DRIFT’s Conceptual Framework
Let us start by examining those basic domains and relations that determine DRIFT’s class
of potential models, thereby constituting its basic conceptual framework.
DRIFT’s basic domains are represented by L, which is a set of volumes of lithosphere,
T, which is interpreted as a set of temporal instants, and S, which represents a set of spatial
regions. These three domains are finite, non-empty sets, and T = {t1, t2}.
As for the non-basic domains or subsets of L, we have U, which is a set of volumes of
earth’s crust, C, which is interpreted as being a set of volumes corresponding to continents,
M, interpreted as a set of volumes corresponding to mountains, and F, equated with a set of
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volumes corresponding to sea floors. All of them are non-empty subsets of U, and F \
C = [.
Passing now to DRIFT’s relational concepts, we find P, which is the mereological
relation of parthood between volumes of crust, and does not have a functional character. P
( U 9 U, and it determines a partial, non-strict order. The movement of the continents is
represented by means of the function d, under which each volume corresponding to a
continent and a certain spatial region in t1 have assigned the volume of a continent and a
different spatial region in t2:
d : ðC  S  ft1gÞ ! ðC  S  ft2gÞ
The function k determines the kinetic friction between volumes of continents and volumes
of sea floors, by assigning to each couple of neighbouring continent and sea floor at a given
time a friction coefficient: k: C 9 F 9 T ? R?
I is the fit relation between volumes of continents and its character is not functional: I(
C 9 C
The structures contained in DRIFT’s class of potential models are tuples of the fol-
lowing kind:\L, U, T, S, C, M, F, R?, d, k, P, I[ , which satisfy the above typifications
and characterizations.
4.1.2 DRIFT’s Laws
Apart from the axiom (1) stating that DRIFT’s class of actual models is a subset of its class
of potential models, there are three fundamental laws unfolding DRIFT’s specific content.
Axiom (2) establishes that all continents existing today were part of the same continent
at t1. That is:
There is a c’[ C at t1 such that for all c [ C at t2: cPc’ at t1
In axiom (3), continents’ outline fit occurring at present is explained on the basis of a
previous continental separation. Formally expressed:
There are some c, c’,c’’ [ C such that: if cPc’’ and c’Pc’’ at t1 and it is not the case that
cPc’’ nor that c’Pc’’ at t2, then cIc’ at t2
Axiom (4) states that the location of continents changes along time, which means that
continents move with respect to each other. That is:
For all c [ C: there is some\c, s, t1[ [ Dom(d) such that: d(\c, s, t1[) =\ c, s’,
t2[ and s = s’
Finally, the last law asserts that mountain formation depends on some kinetic friction
taking place between continents and sea floors. Put formally:
Axiom (5) For all m [ M, c [ C and f [ F:
there is some f [ F such that if k(\c, f, t1[) = i = 0 and k(\c, f, t2[) = i’ with i’[ i,
then mPc or mPf at t2
4.1.3 DRIFT’s Empirical Framework
Turning now to DRIFT’s class of partial potential models, let us see what elements of the
tuple representing the potential models should be removed given the fact that their
determination necessarily involves DRIFT’s fundamental laws. Such removal leads to the
following kind of structure:
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y is a partial potential model of the continental drift theory (y [ Mpp(DRIF)) iff there
exists an x such that x =\L, U, T, S, C, M, F, R?, d, k, P, I[ [Mp(DRIFT) and y =\L,
U, T, S, C, M, F, R?, P, I[ .
The matter of theoreticity concerns L, U, T, S, C, M, F, d, k, P, I. The three basic sets,
along with the four non-basic ones, and the (non-functional) relations P and I are DRIFT-
non-theoretical, as they may all be determined without relying on DRIFT’s fundamental
laws. d and k, by contrast, must be considered as DRIFT-theoretical given its dependence
on these laws, more specifically on axioms (4) and (5). The notions of continental
movement and kinetic friction between continents and sea floors can only be defined on the
basis of DRIFT’s postulation of such functions.
I shall now go on to examine the criteria for determining the functions and/or notions
expressed by DRIFT-non-theoretical terms. The phenomena or entities to which these
terms refer will be recognized, at least in part, by taking these criteria into consideration.
The notion of lithosphere (L) was first introduced by Joseph Barrell in 1914, with the
publication of his article ‘‘The Strength of the Earth’s Crust’’, and more than two decades
later developed by Reginald Aldworth Daly in his Strength and Structure of the Earth
(1940). The term´ lithosphere’ referred to the Earth’s strong outer layer, which was thought
to surround a weaker, floating layer called ‘asthenosphere’. Several striking gravity
anomalies over continental crust were explained on the basis of these two notions. The
determination of T and S respectively requires some type of chronometric and topological
theory. As for U, C, M and F, during the historical period in which DRIFT prevailed they
were determined by principally applying pre-scientific notions, belonging to the sphere of
ordinary knowledge. The notions of crust, continent, mountain and sea floor were intro-
duced into geological theories as primitive terms, and therefore they were not defined in
these theories. Each of these notions could only be determined on the basis of a disjunction
of descriptions or predicates that express different properties: location, surroundings,
material constitution, shape, etc. On the other hand, regarding DRIFT-non-theoretical
relations, the use of some mereological theory is essential in the determination of the
parthood relation P, and some cartographic studies are needed to determine the fit between
volumes of continents I.
Continent and mountain formation were the principal phenomena dealt with by theories
previous to DRIFT. In addition to the relation of fit between volumes of continents I,
C and M are the main DRIFT-non-theoretical domains to be explained by the theory.
4.2 Plate tectonics (‘TEC’ in what follows)
4.2.1 TEC’s Theoretical Framework
TEC includes all of DRIFT’s basic and non-basic domains, therefore L, U, T, S, C, M, and
F are interpreted the same way as in DRIFT. There is a new non-basic domain added in
TEC, namely, O, which is a subset of L and is interpreted as a set of tectonic plates.
All of DRIFT’s relational concepts are also included in TEC, with the addition of six
more, namely, sea floor spreading, sea floor destruction, seismic activity, movement of the
tectonic plates, kinetic friction between continents and that between tectonic plates. More
precisely, e is a function that determines the sea floor spreading by assigning to some
volume of sea floor f at t1 a bigger volume of sea floor f’ at t2:
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e : ðF  ft1gÞ ! ðF  ft2gÞ
The function r determines the sea floor destruction, assigning to some volume of sea floor
f at t1 a smaller volume of sea floor f’ at t2: r: (F 9 {t1}) ? (F 9 {t2}).
The seismic activity is represented by the function h, which assigns to a certain volume
of lithosphere and temporal instant a frequency of vibration as an element of R?: h:
U 9 T ? R?.
The movement of the tectonic plates is represented by means of the function g. Under it,
each volume corresponding to a tectonic plate and a certain spatial region in t1 are assigned
the same volume of tectonic plates and a different spatial region in t2.
g : O  S  ft1gð Þ ! O  S  ft2gð Þ
The function q determines the kinetic friction between volumes of continents, by assigning
to each couple of neighbouring volumes and a certain temporal instant a friction coeffi-
cient: q: C 9 C 9 T ? R?.
Similarly, under the function n each couple of neighbouring volumes corresponding to
tectonic plates and a certain temporal instant are assigned a friction coefficient: n:
O 9 O 9 T ? R?.
The structures contained in TEC’s class of potential models must satisfy the typifica-
tions and characterizations mentioned above, thereby forming tuples like the follow-
ing:\L, U, T, S, O, C, M, F, R?, d, P, I, e, r, h, g, k, q, n[ .
4.2.2 TEC’s Laws
As usual, axiom (1) simply states that TEC’s class of actual models is a subset of its class
of potential models. TEC’s specific content is unfolded in seven fundamental laws.
Axiom (4) establishes that sea floor spreading and sea floor destruction are connected to
the movement of tectonic plates, and also that the amount of sea floor spreading is
approximately the same as the amount of sea floor destruction. Put formally:
For all o [ O there are some f, f’ [ F such that:
(4i) if e(\f, t2[)[ f at t1 and r(\f’, t2[)\ f’ at t1, then there is a\ o, s’, t2[ [
Codom(g)
(4ii) for all (\f, t1[) [ Dom(e) and (\f’, t1[) [ Dom(r): e(\f, t2[) & r(\f, t2[)
In axiom (5), continental movement is explained on the basis of the movement of
tectonic plates, which causes a variation in the positions of continents. That is:
For all\ c, s, t1[ [ Dom(d) there is a\ o, s, t1[ [ Dom(g) such that: if (4) is the
case, then d(\ c, s, t1[) =\ c, s’, t2[
Axiom (6) asserts that mountains form due to kinetic friction either between continents
or between continents and sea floors. Formally expressed:
For all m [ M, c, c’[ C, either:
(6i) if q(\ c, c’, t1[) = i = 0 and q(\ c, c’, t2[) = i’ with i’[ i, then, neither mPc
nor mPc’ at t1, and mPc or mPc’ at t2,
(6ii) there is some f [ F such that if k(\ c, f, t1[) = i= 0 and k(\ c, f, t2[) = i’ with
i’[ i, then, neither mPc nor mPf at t1, and mPc or mPf at t2
In axiom (7), every part of a continent and of a sea floor is required to be part of some
tectonic plate, although not all of them are part of the same one. That is:
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For all c, f [ U there are some o, o’ [ O such that: cPo or cPo’ and fPo or fPo’, and it is
not the case that there is an o [ O such that for all c, f [ C: cPo and fPo
Finally, in axiom (8), seismic activity is accounted for on the basis of kinetic friction
between tectonic plates. Put formally:
For all u [ Dom(h) there is some\ o, o’, t1[ [ Dom(n) such that: if n(\ o, o’, t2[)=
0 then h(\ u, t2[) = 0.
4.2.3 TEC’s Empirical Framework
TEC’s empirical concepts, i.e., those determining its class of partial potential models and
independent of its fundamental laws, can be represented as follows:
Mpp(TEC): y is a partial potential model of plate tectonics (y [ Mpp(TEC)) iff there
exists an x such that x =\L, U, T, S, O, C, M, F, R?, d, P, I, e, r, h, g, k, q, n[ [
Mp(TEC) and y =\L, U, T, S, C, M, F, R
?, P, I, h[
The question of theoreticity concerns L, U, T, S, O, C, M, F, R?, d, P, I, e, r, h, g, k, q,
n. TEC includes all DRIFT-non-theoretical concepts, namely: L, U, T, S, C, M, F, P, I. In
addition to them, TEC includes a new TEC-non-theoretical concept, that of seismic
activity (h), whose determination does not involve TEC’s laws, but merely relying on
observations obtained from the use of instruments such as seismographs or seismometers.
As for TEC-theoretical concepts, it is worth noting that d, which is the main DRIFT-
theoretical concept, is included in TEC as a TEC-theoretical concept as well, since,
according to TEC’s upholders, determining d requires the assumption that some moving
tectonic plates underlie the continents (axiom 5). As emphasized by numerous scholars
(Gould 1977; Laudan 1978; Marvin 2001; Ruse 1981/1989), continental movement was
not unanimously regarded as an acceptable postulated phenomenon until TEC’s propo-
nents offered a more detailed and better empirically grounded account of such phe-
nomenon. Something similar happens with k (the concept of kinetic friction between
continents and sea floors), which is both DRIFT-theoretical and TEC-theoretical. While
determining k within DRIFT always presupposes applying axioms (4) and (5) from this
theory, determining k within TEC always requires assuming axioms (5) and (6ii) from
TEC. Thus, even if the concept of kinetic friction between continents and sea floors is
included in both theories, its determination involves the assumption of different axioms
depending on what theory we are applying. If we apply DRIFT, a necessary assumption is
the motion of continents, whereas if we apply TEC, a necessary assumption is the motion
of tectonic plates, since otherwise continental drift would not be assumed. Yet, continental
drift is a shared presupposition in both theories when k needs to be determined. More
precisely, in determining k, continental drift is the main presupposition held by DRIFT’s
advocates, and is only part of the main presupposition held by TEC’s proponents.8 Here
again it becomes evident that overcoming the long-term skepticism aroused by continental
drift as postulated from DRIFT did not only involve new independent evidence supporting
8 Kinetic friction is thus one of the parameters common to both DRIFT and TEC. To be more faithful to the
historical background, it would be necessary to distinguish between viscous friction and rigid friction.
Wegener postulated a viscous friction that would operate between continents and sea floors, since he
conjectured that there was a process of plastic yielding of the oceanic ‘‘sima’’ and likewise a process of
plastic folding (mountain building) of the continental ‘‘sial’’ upon lateral compression. On the other hand, by
adding the concept of rigid plate, TEC also contains viscous friction both at the plates’ bottom (convection
as a plate driving force) and between continents as well as rigid friction at the plates’ margins (as the cause
of earthquakes). However, for reasons of parsimony, the above distinctions have not been included in the
formal reconstruction of both theories.
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TEC, but also an essential connection between the postulated phenomena of continental
drift and tectonic motion.
Among the other TEC-theoretical concepts, e, r, O, g, q and n, none are shared with
previous geological theories. The notion of tectonic plate and that of tectonic plate’s
movement are specific of TEC and they refer respectively to a kind of entity and property
whose determination always depends on axioms (4) and (5). On the other hand, neither sea
floor spreading (e), nor sea floor destruction (r) can be defined unless axiom (4) is
endorsed. Characterizing the notion of kinetic friction, either between continents, sea floors
and continents or between tectonic plates, requires endorsing axioms (6) and (8)
respectively.
4.3 The Embedding of Continental Drift into Plate Tectonics
Let us move now to the question of the connection between both theories. The fact that
there is an inter-theoretical relation between TEC and DRIFT is manifest not only in their
mutual appeal to the concept of continental movement, but also in both theories sharing
some (parts) of their fundamental laws. In particular, axioms 2 and 3 are shared by both,
and axioms 4 and 5 from DRIFT are part of axioms 5 and 6 in TEC. Note that the idea that
this inter-theoretical relation is one of (strong) theoretization should be discarded, since, as
already explained at the end of Sect. 3, DRIFT-theoretical concepts are not included in
TEC as TEC-non-theoretical ones but are instead presupposed in TEC-theoretical ones.
There are two main reasons to come to this conclusion. First, Wegener’s theory was
generally not accepted by the scientific community at the time when TEC developed, and
consequently the motion of continents was far from being regarded as a well-established
empirical in need for explanation. Second, continental lateral motion is part of the complex
conjecture put forward by TEC’s upholders in order to explain a wide variety of empirical
phenomena, some of them also targeted by Wegener’s conjecture. In other words,
DRIFT’s explanatory resources are kept or embedded in TEC also as explanatory
resources. Therefore, as suggested in the first section and argued next, the relation between
both theories is best captured in terms of embedding.
In illustrating how Definition 2.2. applies to this case, the notion of theory-net will be
replaced by that of theory-element, for, as pointed out earlier, no specializations have been
distinguished in the previous reconstructions, which were limited to the respective basic
theory-elements of DRIFT and TEC. Given the nature of the conditions specified in the
definition of embedding, nothing essential is lost in making use of this option. According to
such definition, for DRIFT to be embedded into TEC, two conditions should be met,
namely:
1. That to every successful model in DRIFT there corresponds a set-theoretic construct
in TEC that results from performing operation H over the components of such model
and constitutes a successful model in TEC,
2. That for every successful application in DRIFT there is a set-theoretic construct in
TEC that results from performing operation H over the components of such
application and constitutes a successful application in TEC.
Intuitively, the embedding at the theoretical level is captured by the first condition, and
the requirement for embedding at the empirical level is expressed by the second condition.
If we use the notation introduced in Sect. 2, we can paraphrase the conditions as stating
that every successful model in DRIFT should be an (approximative) echeloned partial
substructure of some successful model in TEC, and every successful intended application
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in DRIFT should be an (approximative) echeloned partial substructure of some successful
intended application in TEC.
In the interest of simplicity, the fit of the continental edges and mountain formation will be
regarded as DRIFT’s main (paradigmatic) intended applications, and these together with
seismic activity as TEC’s main (paradigmatic) ones. Now, as we know from the previous
sections, DRIFT’s successful models xD are tuples of the following kind:\L, U, T, S, C, M,
F, R?, d, k, P, I[ , satisfying the typifications, characterizations and laws made explicit
above, and whose empirical substructures correspond to DRIFT’s paradigmatic intended
applications. Similarly, TEC’s successful models xT are structures that can be represented as
follows:\L, U, T, S, O, C, M, F, R?, d, P, I, e, r, h, m, k, q, n[ , meeting all the corresponding
conditions and whose empirical substructures correspond to TEC’s paradigmatic intended
applications. Taking into account that all successful applications of DRIFT’s models—
regarding the fit of continental coastlines and mountain building- are also successful
applications of TEC’s models, it seems obvious that the empirical side of condition (1) is
met, i.e., there is a successful model in TEC for every successful model in DRIFT.
Let us now focus on the formal side of the first condition (1). To see whether this
condition is fully met, we need to apply Definition 1.5 and check whether every xD is an
(approximative) echeloned partial substructure of some xT, since in that case xD is an
echeloned partial substructure xT (xD g xT). According to the definition of echeloned
partial substructure (1.5.), then we must determine whether for all xDi 2^ xD there is some
xTk 2^ xT such that xDi [ H(xTk).
In the present case, however, there is no need to operate with partial substructures (xDi)
of DRIFT’s successful models (xD), for the whole structures from DRIFT are preserved in
TEC. On the other hand, the relevant partial substructure of xT looks like the following
9:
xTk¼hL; U; T ; S; C; M; F; Rþ; d; k; P; Ii
It should be noted that xTk is simply the result of removing some of the TEC-theoretical
components from xTk. This operation provides a partial substructure of xT that is identical
to xD =\L, U, T, S, C, M, F, R
?, d, k, P, I[ . So we arrive at the following result:
for all xD there is some xTk 2^ xT such that xD = xTk, thus, by Definition 1.2., xD 2^ xT.
That is, every successful model in DRIFT is a partial substructure of a successful model
in TEC, as every component from the former is also a component from the latter, while the
reverse does not hold. This result is even stricter in terms of preservation than what was
required in Definition 2.2. for embedding, since what is preserved from the previous theory
is not just echeloned partial substructures, not even partial substructures, but whole
structures.
As for condition (2) of embedding, similar considerations apply. As pointed out earlier,
all of DRIFT’s successful applications (yD) are also TEC’s successful applications (yT).
Again at the level of successful applications it is not necessary to operate with DRIFT’s
partial substructures (yDi), for the whole structures from DRIFT’s class of successful
applications, as well as the specific interpretations of such structures, are preserved in
TEC. Here the relevant partial substructure of yT would be the following:
yTk ¼\L; U; T; S; C; M; F; Rþ; P; I[
This partial substructure results simply from removing the component h (i.e., the function
for seismic activity) from TEC-non theoretical components. As happened at the theoretical
9 In ‘xDi’ ‘i’ is a sub-index of a sub-index (‘T’). The same goes for ‘xTk’, ‘yDi’, yTk’.
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level, this operation provides a partial substructure of yT that is identical to yD =\L, U, T,
S, C, M, F, R?, P, I[ . So we obtain an analogous result at the non-theoretical level:
for all yD there is some yTk 2^ yT such that yD = yTk, thus, by Definition 1.2., yD 2^ yT.
This means that every successful application in DRIFT is a partial substructure of a
successful application in TEC, given that every component from the former is also a
component from the latter, and not the other way around. Again in terms of preservation,
this result goes further than what was contemplated in the definition of embedding, for
whole empirical structures from DRIFT, as well as the specific interpretations of such
structures, as opposed to either echeloned partial substructures or partial substructures,
have been preserved in TEC.
5 Conclusions
The present study has shown that the relation between drift theory and plate tectonics
fulfills the conditions for embedding. All theoretical concepts from drift theory are pre-
supposed in some theoretical concepts from plate tectonics, and all empirical concepts of
the former are shared by the latter. Furthermore, all the successful paradigmatic applica-
tions of continental drift are also successful applications of plate tectonics. As seen in the
previous discussion, there is no semantic incommensurability between both theories, since
they are not only conceptually compatible but also complementary. The taxonomic
changes identified by Thagard thus result in an addition of properties ascribed to continents
and sea floors, rather than in conflicting conceptualizations.
This approach also rules out the possibility of regarding plate tectonics as a theoretization
of drift theory—something frequently suggested from standard historical accounts-, since the
theoretical concepts of continental drift are not included among the non-theoretical ones of
plate tectonics. In fact, the very concept of continental drift is included in plate tectonics as a
theoretical concept as well, since, according to the upholders of the latter, determining
continental motion requires the assumption that some moving tectonic plates underlie the
continents. This conclusion is in agreement with the view of numerous scholars (Gould 1977;
Laudan 1978; Marvin 2001; Ruse 1981/1989), who have emphasized that continental
movement was not unanimously regarded as real phenomenon until the proponents of plate
tectonics offered a more detailed and better empirically grounded framework to integrate this
phenomenon. The present reconstruction of geological theories shows that the motion of
continents was not part of the intended explanandum of plate tectonics but rather part of its
explanans, for both theories postulate this kind of motion to account for some other facts, like
mountain building or the fit of continental coastlines.
Finally, the embedding of continental drift into plate tectonics undermines the Kuhnian
idea that innovative theories embedding previous ones constitute a hardly existing instance
of scientific development. Here, under the label ‘‘geological revolution’’, we have a salient
historical case of cumulative progress across theory change.
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